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1. Introduction 
 
The integrity of financial disclosure has been an issue of constant concern among 
regulators, financial analyst and accounting practitioners; especially after the series 
of high-profile accounting scandals and frauds involving well-known firms such as 
Worldcom and Enron (US) and One Tel (Australia), Nortel (Canada), Parmalat 
(Italy) and Transmile Group Berhad (Malaysia), Oceanic bank, Intercontinental 
bank, Afribank and Cadbury (Nigeria). For firms in Nigeria, poor corporate 
governance practice have been cited as one of the causes of the corporate collapses 
noticed among firms in the financial sector (Adeyemi and Fagbemi, 2010). This 
phenomenon have waned the public confidence, most especially those in the 
accounting circle. It has consistently raised severe concerns about corporate 
governance practices in a broad-spectrum. More so, it has also brought to spotlight 
issues relating to quality of financial reporting and the weak internal control 
systems among firms (Ebrahim, 2007; Kanchanapoomi, 2005; Bello, 2011; 
Uwuigbe et al., 2014). The corporate failures of such large organisations in the past 
have highlighted the intentional misconduct of managers in a wider-spectrum. In 
addition, there are apprehensions about the weaknesses of corporate governance in 
the past, as it was not effective enough to protect investors from expropriation. 
 
The management of firms’ earnings has also been an issue of continuous concern 
for several years for regulatory bodies and accounting practitioners (Levitt 1998). 
They are seen as an important summary statistic of a firm’s financial performance 
and are often used in firm valuation. According to Leuz et al. (2003), earnings 
management is basically described as the alteration of a firms’ reported economic 
performance by insiders either to mislead stakeholders or to influence contractual 
outcomes. In essences, it basically covers the true financial results and position of 
businesses and obscures facts that stakeholders ought to know (Loomis, 1999). 
However, earnings management basically occurs when managers use personal 
opinion in reporting financial information and in structuring accounting 
transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead stakeholders on the original 
economic performance of the company or to manipulate contractual outcomes that 
depend on reported accounting numbers (Healy & Wahlen, 1999). Thus, the very 
nature of accounting accruals gives managers a great deal of discretion in 
determining the earnings a firm reports in any given period because of the 
information asymmetry relationship that exist between managers and owners. 
Managers can manipulate or influence earnings in order to maximize their own 
interests or to signal their private information, thus influencing the informativeness 
of earnings (Chung et al., 2002; Gul et al., 2003). 
 
Neverthelss, in an environment characterized by imperfect information, a variance 
in the interest between management and shareholders can lead to sub-optimal 
management decisions. Such decisions are possible because the actions of 
managers are largely unobservable and the goals of the managers and their 
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shareholders are not necessarily aligned. Managers are posited to opportunistically 
manage earnings to maximize their utility at the expense of other stakeholders. 
These problems are envisaged to be much more significant in an emerging market 
where many market imperfections continue to persist. This is particularly the case 
in Nigeria where despite the publication of a new corporate governance code in 
2003 and 2011; there are still cases of misappropriation of fund and falsification of 
reports to suit management interest. However, this problem is not only adduced to 
poor corporate governance practice, but also, the low quality of financial 
information disclosure has led to series of corporate failures and scandals. Hence, 
this study adds to the body of existing knowledge by investigating the effects of 
corporate governance mechanisms on the earning management of listed firms in 
Nigeria. To archieve this objective, the annual reports for the period 2007-2011 
were analyzed. In addition, the study considered a total of 40 listed firms in the 
Nigerian stock exchange market. The choice of the selected firms arises based on 
the nature and extent of corporate financial failures and scandals that has been 
withnessed in the industry overtime.  
 
To gain more insight into this paper, the paper has been organized as follows. 
Section 2 presents an in-depth review of related relevant literatures and hypotheses 
development. While section 3 focused on the research methodology adopted for the 
study; section 4 and 5 discusses the findings and conclusion of study. 
 
 
2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
 
Corporate governance as the term implies is a mechanism that is employed to 
reduce the agency cost that arises as a result of the conflict of interest between 
managers and shareholders. The role of corporate governance according to 
Solabomi, and Uwuigbe (2013) is to reduce the divergence of interests between 
shareholders and managers. It remains one of the most important determinants in 
ensuring the quality of the financial reporting process. It is a set of mechanisms 
that affect how a corporation is operated. It deals with the welfare and goals of all 
the stakeholders, including shareholders, management, board of directors, lenders, 
regulators, and the economy as a whole. It has been in the front burners of recent 
discussions due to the series of highly publicized financial reporting frauds at 
Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia and Parmalat in particular, and a very high level of 
earnings restatements. While prior research in accounting literatures has looked at 
the relationship between different corporate governance variables and earnings 
management, the vast majority of these prior literatures has basically focused on 
the board and audit committee as proxy for corporate governance variables 
(Beasley, 1996; Peasnell, et al., 2005). In addition, prior accounting research that 
specifically examined the impact of corporate governance on earnings management 
is quite limited especially in emerging markets (e.g. Nigeria). However, Klein 
(2002) addressed this phenomenon by focusing more on the extent than the 
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direction of earnings management. Klein opined that earning management is 
positively related to the CEO holding a position on the board’s nominating and 
compensation committees. Similarly, Anderson et al. (2003) also observed that the 
separation between CEO and board chair positions appears to positively influence 
the information content of accounting earnings. 
 
In U.S, Dechow et al. (1996) examined 96 firms subject to earnings manipulation 
enforcement action by the Securities and Exchange Commission and observed that 
firms whose CEO is also chair of the board of directors are more likely to be 
subjected to accounting enforcement action by SEC for alleged violations of 
GAAP. Also, Xie et al. (2003) examined the characteristics of the board in 
constraining earnings management using discretionary current accruals to measure 
earnings management for a sample of 282 US firms for the period 1992 to 1996. 
They observed that earnings management is less likely to take place in firms with 
larger boards. More so, Bedard et al. (2004) in their study found a significant 
negative relationship between measures of earnings management and the all-
independent audit committees. However, they found no significant relationship 
between earnings management and audit committee proxied by annual meetings. 
Cheng and Warfield (2005) investigated whether the propensity for earnings 
management is lower when management interest’s and owners’ interests are 
aligned through higher managerial ownership. Their results confirmed that earnings 
management is lower for firms with higher managerial ownership. Shen and Chih 
(2007) in a related study observed that effective corporate governance mechanism 
tend to conduct less earnings management practices. Similarly, Abdul Rahman and 
Ali (2006) and Epps and Ismail (2008) confirmed that board characteristics are 
major determinants of earnings management.  
 
In the UK, Peasnell et al. (2005), examined whether the association between board 
composition and earnings management differs between the pre and post-Cadbury 
periods. They found the evidence of accrual management to meet earnings targets 
in both periods. However, only the post Cadbury period indicates less income-
increasing accrual management to avoid earnings losses or earnings declines when 
the proportion of non-executive directors is high. These results offer clear evidence 
of the impact of independent outside directors on constraining earnings 
management in the UK.  
 
More recently, Osma (2008) explores different types of earnings manipulation and 
analyses the effect of independent boards on constraining research and 
development (R&D) spending manipulation. They consisidered the entire UK non-
financial firms and their sample consisted of 3,438 firm-years, for the period 1990 
to 2002. Results from there study indicated that independent directors are capable 
of identifying and constraining earnings management practices. In Canada, Park 
and Shin (2004) investigated the effect of board composition on the level of 
earnings management in a sample of 539 firm-years. Using the modified Jones 
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model as a proxy for earnings management, they observed that independent outside 
directors do not reduce discretionary accruals whereas outside directors from 
financial intermediaries and active institutional shareholders do reduce earnings 
management.  
 
In the U.S, Cornett et al. (2006) basically examined whether corporate governance 
mechanisms affects earnings management at the largest publicly traded bank 
holding companies in the United States. Evidence from their findings showed that 
the use of discretionary accruals is positively related to a bank‘s unmanaged 
operating performance, capital ratios, and asset size. However, in contrast, the use 
of discretionary accruals is negatively related to a bank‘s non-discretionary 
accruals and market-to-book ratios. In a related study from China, Liu and Lu 
(2007) examined the relationship between earnings management and corporate 
governance by introducing a tunneling perspective. They observed that firms with 
higher corporate governance levels have lower levels of earnings management.  
 
Also, Prencipe and Bar-Yosef (2009) examined the effectiveness of board 
independence on earnings management in family-controlled companies. Empirical 
results provided from their study indicated that the impact of board independence 
on earnings management is indeed weaker in family-controlled companies. The 
same result also holds for the lack of CEO/board chairman duality function. 
Similarly, Al-khabash and Al-Thuneibat (2009) provided empirical evidence 
concerning the existence of earnings management from the perspective of external 
and internal auditors in Jordan, and they believed that managers operated by either 
increasing or decreasing their earnings in order to legitimize their activities. Also, 
their study revealed that firms with boards and/or audit committees composed of 
independent directors are less likely to have larger abnormal accruals. 
  
Al-Fayoumi et al. (2010) in the Jordanian context examined the relationship 
between earnings management and ownership structure for the period 2001-2005. 
They observed that managers’ ownership is ineffective in aligning managers to 
take value maximizing decisions. In addition, they observed an insignificant role 
for bulk holders in monitoring managerial unethical behavior relating to earnings 
management.  
 
In Nigerian, Umorem (2010) in a related study examined the relationship between 
corporate governance attributes and the level of voluntary disclosures among firms 
in Nigeria. Using t-test and analysis of variance technique the study observed that 
the level of voluntary disclosure among listed firms in Nigeria was low. Similarly, 
Uwuigbe (2011) using the peason correlation and regression analysis method of 
data analysis, observed that a significant negative relationship exists between board 
size, board composition and financial performance of listed firms in Nigeria. In 
addition, Bello (2011) using the probit analysis in a related study on earnings 
management observed that there was a positive significant relationship between 
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board size, board performance on ethical accounting practices. The study also 
observed that board composition has a significant negative effect on ethical 
accounting practices. 
 
Although the relationship between corporate governance and earnings management 
has been the subject of an extensive research in developed economies, the same is 
not true in developing economies like Nigeria where there is a relatively dearth in 
literature. Hence this study therefore tends to fill this gap in literature by examing 
the effects of corporate governance mechanisms on earnings management of listed 
firms in Nigeria. 
 
Drawing from the literature, the hypotheses to be tested in this study are stated 
below in their null forms: 
1) Ho: There is no significant relationship between board size and earnings 
management. 
2) Ho: Board independence has no significant effect on the earnings 
management of firms. 
3) Ho: CEO duality has no significant effect on the earnings management of 
firms. 
 
 
3. Methodology 
 
To achieve the objectives of this study, the annual report for the period 2007-2011 
were analyzed. The choice of these period arises based on the fact that it recorded a 
large number of corporate frauds arising from firms in Nigeria due to poor 
corporate governance practice. However, using the judgmental sampling technique; 
a total of 40 listed firms were analysed. This represents 20.5% of the total 
population. This is consistent with the propositions of Krejcie & Morgan (1970) 
where a minimum of 5% of a defined population is considered as an appropriate 
sample size in making generalization. The choice of the selected firms’ arises 
based on the nature and extent of corporate failures and scandals  that has 
bedivilled industry overtime. Nevertheless, in testing the research hypothesis, the 
ordinary least square (OLS) was used in the estimation of the regression equation 
under consideration. 
 
3.1  Specifications of the 3conometric model 
 
3.1.1.  Dependent Variable 
 
The dependent variable in this study is earnings management. However, based on 
prior literatures, it was observed that the modified Jones model is the most famous 
and most frequently used model used to detecting earnings management. Thus it 
was adopted in this study in determing the discretionary component of accruals. 
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The model was adopted because it is easier to manage earnings via credit sales than 
cash collections. Also, it attempts to control for the endogeniety bias in the 
original. More so, it is one of the most commonly used models in addressing issues 
relating to management discretionary behaviours. In addition, the cash flows 
statement approach is adopted in this study for the calculation of total accruals.  
 
TA/A (t-1) = β1 [1/ At-1] + β 2 [(∆ in REV-∆ in REC) /At-1) + β 3 [PPE/At-1] +  
 + ϵit      (i) 
 
Where: 
TAit       =  Total accruals in year t for firm i. 
∆REVit = Revenues in year t less revenues in year t-1 for firm i (change in 
revenue) 
∆RECit = Receivables in year t less receivables in year t-1 for firm i 
(change in receivables) 
PPEit     =  Gross property, plant, and equipment in year t for firm i 
(property, plant & equipment). 
Ait-1         =  Total assets in year t-1 for firm i (total assets for the previous 
year) 
β1, β2, β3 = Represents firms specific parameters. 
ϵ          = Residual here represents the firm specific discretionary portion 
off accruals. 
 
However, while the right side of the equation represents the non-discretionary 
accruals (NDA), the net result for the left side of the equation amounts to the total 
accruals (TA). Nevertheless, taking the difference between the total accruals and 
the non-discretionary accruals; it amounts to the discretionary accruals (DA) which 
is basically used in this study to represent earning management. Hence, the higher 
the value of discretionary accruals, the more likely the presence of earnings 
manipulation and vice versa as depicted in equation (2): 
 
DAi-t = TACit/Ait-1 - αt [1/Ait-1] + α1i [(∆REV- ∆REC)/Ait-1] + α2i [PPEit/Ait-1]   
    + ϵit      (ii) 
 
3.1.2.  Independent Variable 
 
 
The independent variable in this study is corporate governance. The corporate 
governance variables adopted for this study includes board size, board 
independence and ceoduality. On the other hand, firm size proxied by total asset is 
used in this study to represent the control variable. Thus introducing the constructs 
of the dependent and independent variables, the regression equation adapted for 
this study is modeled in the following functional form as: 
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 DAi-t = β0 + β1 BSi-t + β2 BCi-t + β3CEODUAL i-t + FSIZEi-t +µ i-t…… (iii) 
 
Where 
DA               = Discretionary Accruals (which is the proxy for earnings 
management)  
BSIZE         = Board Size; (which represents the number of directors on the 
board). 
BDIND       = Board Independence is the proportion of non-executive 
directors to total board composition.  
CEODUAL = CEO duality is captured by assigning 1 if the CEO serves 
also as the chairman and 0 if otherwise 0. 
FSIZE          =  Firm Size is measured by the Log of total asset (Control 
Variable). 
Β1-3              = Coefficients to be estimated or the Coefficients of slope 
parameters. 
µ                   = Error term; it captures other explanatory variables not 
clearly included in the model. 
i-t                 = Where i and t represent all the 40 companies and the 5 years 
time period respectively. 
The expected signs of the coefficients (i.e. a priori 
expectations) are such that β1, β2 while β2  < 0.  
 
Table 1. Averaged data for the selected listed firms used in the study  
for the period under consideration 
 
S/N FIRMS  LOGDA BSIZE BIND CEODUAL FSIZE 
1 Evans Medical Plc     4.70     5.00     6.00      .00     4.40 
2 G S K Consumer Plc     4.65     7.20     5.60      .00     4.95 
3 May and Baker Nig. Plc     4.55     6.80     6.00      .00     4.37 
4 Pharma - Deko Plc     4.95     7.40     6.00      .00     3.80 
5 Guinness Nigeria Plc     4.59    10.40     6.00      .00     4.33 
6 Nigerian Breweries Plc     4.40    11.80     6.00      .00     9.00 
7 Jos International Breweries Plc     4.66     7.20     6.00      .00     4.42 
8 Champion Breweries Plc      4.44    11.00     7.80      .00     9.92 
9 International Breweries Plc       4.39    10.40     8.00      .00     9.20 
10 Lafarge West African Portland 
Cement Plc  
    4.53    10.40     6.00      .00     4.62 
11 Chemical & Allied Products Plc     4.62     9.20     4.00      .00     5.74 
12 D N Meyer Plc     4.10    12.80     5.30      .60     8.85 
13 Nigerian - German Chemical Plc      4.56     8.00     6.00      .00     3.75 
14 Okitipupa Oil Palm Plc     5.50     5.60     4.00     1.00     4.43 
15 Presco Plc      5.61     4.40     4.40     1.00     3.92 
16 Okomu Oil Palm Plc      4.09    12.60     8.20      .00     4.00 
17 Ellah - Lakes Plc     4.63     9.00     4.40      .00     2.02 
18 Livestock   Feeds Plc     4.66    12.60     6.00      .00     2.85 
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S/N FIRMS  LOGDA BSIZE BIND CEODUAL FSIZE 
19 Ashaka Cement Company Plc     4.62     8.20     4.40      .00     2.34 
20 Benue Cement Company Plc 
(BCC) 
    4.59     9.60     4.00      .00     4.08 
21 Cement Company of Northern 
(Nigeria) Plc 
    4.77    12.40     6.00     1.00     2.84 
22 Ceramic Manufacturers Nigeria 
Plc  
    4.11     9.20     8.10      .00     9.80 
23 African Petroleum Plc     5.59     5.00     4.00     1.00     2.73 
24 Chevron  Oil Nigeria Plc     5.45     4.00     4.00     1.00     3.70 
25 Mobile Oil Nigeria Plc     4.67     7.80     4.00      .00     3.57 
26 Conoil     4.32     9.80     6.60      .00     3.60 
27 Oando Plc       4.71     8.60     3.00      .00     3.54 
28 Total Nigeria Plc      4.71    12.60     3.20      .00     2.99 
29 BOS Gases Plc     4.40    11.80     6.50      .00     9.28 
30 African Paints (Nigeria) Plc     5.17     4.60     3.90     1.00     3.70 
31 Ecobank Plc     4.62     7.80     5.40      .00     4.64 
32 First Bank Plc     4.46     7.00     6.00      .00     9.88 
33 Fidelity Bank     4.41     9.00     4.00      .00     9.20 
34 Access Bank plc     4.58     9.60     6.00      .00     5.60 
35 First Bank of Nigeria plc     4.61     8.80     6.00      .00     5.32 
36 First inland bank plc     4.39    10.60     5.34      .00     3.20 
37 Guaranty trust bank plc     4.62    10.80     6.00      .00     7.35 
38 Oceanic bank international plc     4.39     9.00     5.80      .00     4.10 
39 Berger Paints Plc      4.72     8.00     4.10      .00     3.37 
40 BCN Plc     4.53     7.20     5.20      .00     3.62 
Source: (2007-2011 Annual report) 
  
4. Discussion of findings 
 
The descriptive statistics for the sampled firms as shown in table (2) indicate that 
while the discretionary accruals for the selected firms have an approximate mean 
value of about 4.65; on the other hand, board size (BSIZE), board independence 
(BIND) and CEO duality (CEODUAL)  had the mean values of 8.83, 5.43, and 
.165 respectively. This results implies that the board size for the selected listed 
firms is made up of an average of 9 persons which is about two third of the 
maximum 15 member board as specified in the Securities and Exchange 
Commissions’ Code of Corporate Governance of 2003. Also, having an 
approximate mean value of about 2% for CEO duality basically indicates that 2% 
of the selected firms have the same individuals functioning as the Chairman and 
the CEO. In addition, having a mean value of about 54.3% for board independence 
depicts that on the average, there is a greater proportion of non executive directors 
than executive directors on the board.  
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics for selected listed firms 
 
Variables Observations Mean Std. Dev Min. Max 
LOGDA 40 4.65175 .3617754 4.09 5.61 
BSIZE 40 8.83 2.441332 4 12.8 
BIND 40 5.431 1.308896 3 8.2 
CEODUAL 40 .165 .3676328 0 1 
FSIZE 40 5.0755 2.388595 2.02 9.92 
 
Note: *Discretionary accruals were logged due to the large figures derived 
 
Table 3. Correlations Matrix for Sampled firms 
 
 LOGDA BSIZE BIND CEODUAL FSIZE 
LOGDA 1.0000     
BSIZE -0.6965 
0.0000 
1.0000    
BIND -0.5639 
0.0002 
0.3885 
0.0132 
1.0000   
CEODUAL 0.7419 
0.0000 
-0.4170 
0.0074 
-0.3391 
0.0323 
1.0000 
 
 
FSIZE -0.4461 
0.0039 
0.2781 
0.0823 
-0.4745 
0.0020 
-0.2006 
0.2147 
1.0000 
 
Table 4. Anova 
 
 SS df MS 
Model 4.07780035 4 1.01945009 
Residual 1.02657699 35 .029330771 
Total 5.10437734 39 .13088147 
 
Table 5. Regression analysis 
 
LOGDA Coefficients Std. Err. t P > |t| [95% Cof. Interval] 
BSIZE -.056179 .0129829 -4.33 0.000 -.0825357 -.0298222 
BIND -.0480436 .0254387 -1.89 0.067 -.0996868      .0035996 
CEODUAL .4850691 .0839784 5.78 0.000 .3145838 .6555543 
FSIZE -.0241358 .0131317 -1.84 0.075 -.0507946 .0025229 
_CON 5.4512 .1527819 35.68 0.000 5.141036 5.761364 
       
No. of obs 40      
F (4, 35)   34.76      
Prob > F 0.0000      
R-squared 0.7989      
Adj R-squared 0 .7759      
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Table 6. Variance Inflation Factor 
 
Variables VIF 1/VIF 
BIND 1.47 0.678360 
BSIZE 1.34 0.748616 
FSIZE 1.31 0.764421 
CEODUAL 1.27 0.789033 
Mean VIF 1.35  
 
Furthermore, results on the correlation matrix for the sampled firms are depicted in 
table (3). The table presents a correlation coefficient (r) result for board size 
(BSIZE) as it relates to firm’s discretionary accruals to be (-0.6965). This outcome 
implies that there is a significant negative correlation between board size and the 
discretionary accruals of the selected listed firms. Similarly, the table also shows a 
significant negative correlation between board size and discretionary accruals with 
a correlation coefficient value of about -0.5639. This indicates a significant 
negative association between board size and earnings management proxied by 
discretionary accruals for the sampled firms. However, the outcome of the 
correlation coefficient (r) result for CEO duality (CEODUAL) as it relates to the 
discretionary accruals of the sampled firms as depicted in table (3) was (0.7419). 
This outcome basically connotes the fact that there is a significant positive 
association between CEO duality and firms discretionary accruals.  
 
Table (5) displays the result of the regression equation model used to test all the 
stated hypotheses (i.e. H1 - H3) for this study. The use of multivariate hypothesis 
test is based on the assumption of no significant multicollinearity between the 
explanatory variables. Thus, to investigate the existence of multicollinearity, the 
variance inflation factors (VIFs) for each of the explanatory variables are computed 
as depicted table (6). The mean VIF as reported from table (6) is 1.35, which is 
lower than ten (10), a number that is used as a rule of thumb as an indicator of 
multicollinearity problems (Field, 2000). Thus, these results support the lack of 
presence of multicollinearity in the research model. The results of the regression 
analysis can, therefore, be interpreted with a greater degree of confidence. Hence, 
the results for the goodness of fit test as shown in table (5) present an adjusted R2 
value of about 0.7759. This in a nutshell implies that the value of the dependent 
variable can be explained by about 78% of the independent variables. This value 
can be considered sufficient because earnings management can also be influenced 
by other factors beside the attributes of corporate governance. More so, the F- test 
statistics as presented in table (4) shows a p-value that is less than 0.05 (i.e. p-value 
< 0.05). This outcome suggests clearly that simultaneously the explanatory variable 
(i.e. BSIZE, BIND and CEODUAL) are significantly associated with the 
dependent variable.  
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Furthermore, a review of the regression analysis results for the sampled firms 
shows that all the outcomes are consistent with our initially stated a priori 
expectations (i.e. b1, b2  < 0 and b3 > 0). Empirical findings for this study show that 
there is a significant negative relationship between board size and earnings 
management (proxied by discretionary accruals) for the sampled firms. This is 
evident in the probability and t-values of 0.000 and -4.33 respectively. Hence, we 
accept the alternate hypothesis and reject the null hypothesis. This result basically 
indicates that there is an inverse relationship between board size and earnings 
management. This result is indicative of the fact that firms with the large board size 
of directors are more effective in the control of the managers’ discretionary 
latitude. It connotes the fact that larger boards with diverse knowledge are more 
effective for constraining earnings management than smaller boards. In addition, 
large boards with various experts are more likely to have a higher degree of 
independence and expertise than smaller boards in constraining earnings 
management. More so, they are more likely to have independent directors with 
corporate or financial experience, and in turn, may be better at preventing earnings 
management. This outcome however contradicts the findings of Beasley (1996), 
Xie et al. (2003), Gulzar and Wang (2011) were they opined that the more the 
numbers of members on the board, the less effective the supervision to the 
managers, and the more possible managers are involved in earnings management.  
 
Similarly, findings for the second hypothesis show that there is a significant 
negative relationship between board independence and earnings management 
(proxied by discretionary accruals) for the sampled firms in Nigeria. This is evident 
in the probability and t-values of 0.067 and -1.89 respectively. This result implies 
that there is an inverse relationship between board independence and earnings 
management. That is, the more independent a board is, the lesser the level of 
earning management. This result is consistent with the findings (Fama, 1980; Fama 
& Jensen, 1983; Johnson et al., 1996; Peasnell et al., 2005 and Shah & Butt, 2009) 
were they opined that establishing a board that provides effective monitoring of 
management actions depends on its independence. Thus from an agency 
perspective, an independent board is more likely to be vigilant for agency problems 
as it includes a substantial number of non-executive directors (NEDs) who are 
dedicated to monitoring management’s performance and behaviour. Hence, an 
independent board has the potential to detect or reduce the level earnings 
management tendencies and behaviour.  
 
In contrast, findings for the third hypothesis show that there is a significant positive 
relationship between CEO duality and earnings management for the sampled firms 
in Nigeria. This is also evident in the probability and t-values of 0.075 and 5.78 
respectively. Thus, as CEO duality dominance tendencies increases, earnings 
management also increases. That is, CEO duality has a significant positive impact 
on earnings management. Hence, the dual office structure of firms also permits the 
CEO to effectively control information available to other board members and thus 
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impede effective monitoring. Interestingly, despite the environmental and 
contextual differences, findings from this study is in tandem with the 
methodological juxtaposition of Klein (2002), Finkelstein and D’Aveni (1994) and 
Fama and Jensen (1983) were they opined that the existence of CEO duality in a 
firm will lead to a weaker monitoring function of the board and thus would also 
lead to more earnings management in such firms. Thus, they argued that CEO 
dominance combines decision management and decision control functions, which 
could basically erode the board’s ability to exercise effective control. In addition, 
the existence of CEO duality (CEO dominance) role in a firm is likely to lead to 
more opportunistic managerial behavior due to the reduction in effective board 
monitoring over executives. However, this result contradict the findings provide in 
Xie et al. (2003).  
 
 
5. Conclusion  
 
This study basically examined the effects of corporate governance mechanisms on 
earnings management of listed firms in Nigeria. The study used three hypotheses in 
testing the relationship between mechanism of corporate governance and earnings 
management. In each of the hypothesis, discretionary accruals was used as the 
criterion for earnings management in representing the dependent variable. On the 
hand, board size, board independence and CEO duality (proxied by BSIZE, BIND 
and CEODUAL) respectively were used to represent the independent variables. 
The result from our determination test indicates that 78% change in earnings 
management of firms can be explained by corporate governance variables. The 
study further revealed that while a positive relationship existed between CEO 
duality and earnings management; on the other hand, board size and board 
independence had a significant negative impact on the earnings management of 
listed firms in Nigeria. Hence the study concludes that that firms with larger boards 
and diverse knowledge are more likely to be more effective in constraining 
earnings management than smaller boards. More so, larger boards with various 
experts are more likely to have a higher degree of independence and expertise than 
smaller boards in constraining earnings management behavior among firms since 
they are likely to have more independent directors with more corporate or financial 
expertise. The study further concludes that based on the fact that board 
independence can be achieved through the inclusion of disinterested parties, (that is 
outside directors); the independence of the board will basically increase the boards’ 
ability to be more efficient in monitoring the top management activities relating to 
earnings management. In addition, an independent board is likely to have more 
incentive to effectively monitor management because of a strong need to develop 
their reputations as expert decision makers. Thus an independent board of directors 
may provide a better oversight of management in reducing earnings management. 
The study therefore recommends that firms should embrace a well established 
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corporate governance structures that will assist them in reducing financial 
statement fraud. 
 
This study is however limited by the fact that the sample only covers five (5) years 
data from the Nigerian stock exchange market. Also, only three corporate 
governance variables were considered in this study. However, future research could 
consider other corporate governance variables not considered in this study. In 
addition, based on the demerits of the modified Jones model adopted in this study, 
future research could examine other models relating to earnings management and 
corporate governance. 
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